Recognizing the fact that a player's cognition plays a defining role in the resulting equilibrium of a game of competition, this paper provides the foundation for a Nash game with forward-looking players by presenting a formal definition of the Nash game with consideration of the players' belief. We use a simple two-firm model to demonstrate its fundamental difference from the standard Nash and Stackelberg games. Then we show that the players' belief functions can be regarded as the optimization parameters for directing the game towards a much more desirable equilibrium.
Introduction
Game theory has been very well recognized as a branch of applied mathematical tools, best for analyzing the phenomenon of selfish competition, which arises in numerous real-life applications ranging from economics to social sciences, and even to engineering problems. Many optimization problems can be viewed as a competition problem.
If there are shared resources, then inherently there will be competition in the allocation of such resources. An individual who participates in the resource allocation always wishes to maximize its payoff. Nevertheless, the player's return not only depends on its own strategy, but is also dependent on competitors' responses. As a result, ideally, a player should choose or optimize its strategy based on not only its immediate return but also the possible outcomes of how others might respond to its strategy. Apparently, a player's cognition (i.e., its belief on how the environment as a whole would react to any of its action) will be pivotal in the optimization of its strategy for maximizing its payoff and in defining the equilibrium of the game.
In the literature, there are a number of game-theoretic models and they differ in their assumptions on the players' cognition. Due to this fundamental difference, these models represent different competition environments, thereby resulting in very different outcomes, which at the steady state are referred to as equilibria. When the competition process reaches an equilibrium, by definition, no player would have incentive to change their strategies further to deviate from the equilibrium which is therefore usually considered as a satisfactory outcome to all players.
The most popular model has to be the Nash game [1] in which a player has the belief that other players' strategies are fixed and will not change regardless of what it does. A Nash game is based on such assumption on the players' cognition. It is noted that the game is still very well defined, although the player's belief is totally inaccurate.
On the other hand, in a Stackelberg game [2] , there is a super player, commonly known as leader, who knows all the information about its competitors, known as followers. In this case, the leader is considered to have perfect cognition and therefore can obtain the most rewarding strategy.
In most practical competition situations, the efficiency of a Nash game resulting in the most celebrated Nash equilibrium is often poor (which will be revealed by a two-firm example later in this paper). The main reason is that the assumption for the Nash game is too much simplified, and it fails to account for the interaction between the players. In contrast, the assumption for the Stackelberg model is too stringent and it is often too difficult to be qualified to be a leader in most practical scenarios. Nevertheless, the Stackelberg equilibrium is highly beneficial to the leader. The limitation is that if there were two or more leaders, all of which possess perfect cognition and wish to be the biggest winner, this would lead to a tragedy [3] .
In this paper, we recognize the importance of players' cognition in a game, and focus on how the assumption of the players' cognition affects the equilibrium. Based on the analysis of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we provide a new definition for the Nash game with considera tion of the players' belief. As a useful byproduct, the new definition facilitates the interpretation of the players' belief as the optimization parameters, which, if optimized properly, can direct the game towards a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.
Preliminaries

The Two-Firm Model
For illustrative purpose, in this paper, we use a simple two-firm model in economics as an example. In this simple model, there are two firms, Firm A and Firm B. They manufacture an identical product and its unit cost is the same for both firms. In addition, the profit per unit product diminishes as the number of products available in the market increases. In particular, let
denote the number of products manufactured by Firm A, and be that manufactured by Firm B. The unit cost is denoted by and the price per product which is set the same by both Firm A and Firm B is assumed to be a b for some constant . Therefore, the profit functions for Firm A and Firm B are, respectively, given by
In various game-theoretic models, the objective would be for Firm A and Firm B to iteratively optimize their respective strategies, a x and b x , for maximizing their profits (1) in a competitive fashion. Before we examine different equilibria of this two-firm game, we find it useful to first present the general notations of a game.
For a game with > 1 K players, we denote the strategy profile for player as and use
to represent the strategy profile for all the players. Moreover, we use to denote a specific choice of strategy from all the players, where is the strategy adopted by player , and
denotes the adopted strategy by all the players except player . Likewise, the reward function for player k is denoted by
. If the game converges to an equilibrium, then we will use the superscript   f x *  to highlight that the corresponding parameters are at the equilibrium. For instance, we have and
f at the equilibrium.
Nash Competition
Given the competition of K players, if at some point, no one can gain any further by deviating from its present strategy, then the strategy of all the players is said to have reached to an equilibrium [4] . Mathematically, we have     * and : , .
Now, proceed to derive the Nash equilibrium for the two-firm example. According to (4), Firm A solves
As such, it can be easily shown that
Similarly,
* b
x can be derived, resulting the set of simultaneous equations 
As a result, the game governed by (7) will reach the Nash equilibrium
which leads to the profits
It is worth pointing out here that in Nash equilibrium 
Stackelberg Competition
A player can benefit more from the rest of the players in cognition about how a game if this player has perfect others would react to its strategy. This is studied formally by the Stackelberg equilibrium. In the general setting ,
For other players , as they do not have any information about any of the other players' they can that ot k   strategies, only assume her players' strategies are fixed, and will act like a Nash player, see (4) . As a result, we have     * * and : , .
In a Stackelberg game, there is a very strict order of how the players play the game [1, 5] . In particular, leader  needs to first give out its strategy and lets other players compete to reach a Nash equilibrium against this strategy before it revises its strategy for another round of competition among the rest of the players. Achieving the Stackelberg equilibrium will thus require a two-level game.
The merit of Stackelberg equilibrium is that leader  has an absolute advantage over other players but the drawback is that knowing the function   Recalling from the two-firm example, if we let Firm A be the leader and Firm B be llower, then according to (11 the fo ), player B's cognition is that player A's strategy is optimal and fixed and player B therefore aims to solve x , must be obtained first and the follower(s) respond. As the number of players increases, the complexity of the Stackelberg game will increase considerably and the simplicity of the Nash game will prevail. In addition, a game with all leaders degenerates to a Nash game.
In the two-firm example, because Firm A knows precisely the strategy adopted by Firm B (13), it is able to achieve a higher profit than what is achieved by the Nash equilibrium. However, the key questions are:  If (13) This has motivated us to investigate the Nash game with simultaneous forward-looking players, in which each player optimizes its strategy based on its own belief.
3.
the resulting equilibrium of a game. At the same time, we
Forward-Looking Competition
After the discussion of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria above, it is clear that players' cognition is key to defining understand the beauty of the Nash game where players can compete freely (without following a specific order) to reach the equilibrium. Based on these two points, we present the Nash game with forward-looking players.
To facilitate our analysis, we find it useful to have the following definitions.  Environmental function-In a competition process, the reward for player k depends not only its own strategy k x but also others' strategies k  x , at any given time instant t . We use the environmental
to quantify the influence of other players' strategies (at time instant t ) onto player t 's reward. Obviously, other players' strategies can always be treated as some form of response to a given player's strategy at time instant t .  Belief function-A player's understanding on its environmental function reflects its cognition about the competition in the game. We assume that player k possesses the knowledge of a belief function, which is
denotes the strategies from all the players at time instant t except player k , and clearly
x . The latter relationship further suggests to formulate the belief response using some form of Taylor series expansion. For example, we may write
where 
A Motivating Example
In Section 2. mpletely different process. The striking result here is that t librium can now be achieved by a the Nash equilibrium with forward-looking which ends up the same strategy in the Stackelberg equilibrium ( t via a co he Stackelberg equifree competition between the players without following a specific order of how the game should be played and that the so-called leader, i.e., player A here, does not need perfect cognition of the environmental function (13), but a good belief (20).
Definition of the New Equilibrium
Motivated by the potential of being forward-looking, we here present
